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called for, marriage, was the joint act of the promisee and beneficiary. Although each was bound to the other, together they were not bound to anyone. In marrying, they performed an act which no one had a legal right to call upon them to do, and which, therefore, was good consideration. It is immaterial that the consideration did not move from the promisee. *Rector, etc. of St. Mark's v. Teed*, 120 N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014; *West Yorkshire Darracq Agency v. Coleridge*, [1911] 2 K. B. 326. There was, therefore, no necessity to make the parties out joint promisees, as the court attempted to do.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION — SCOPE OF HOME RULE AMENDMENT. — The Ohio constitution provides that "every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years . . . shall have the qualification of an elector, and be entitled to vote at all elections." (OHIO CONSTITUTION, Article V, § 1.) A constitutional amendment provides that "municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self government." (OHIO CONSTITUTION, Article XVIII, § 3.) A city charter gave women the right to vote for municipal officers. *Held*, that the provision of the charter is valid. *State ex rel. Taylor v. French*, 117 N. E. 173 (Ohio).

It has frequently been held that constitutional provisions concerning the elective franchise apply only to offices created by the constitution. *Hanna v. Young*, 84 Md. 179, 35 Atl. 674; *State v. Hanson*, 80 Neb. 724, 115 N. W. 294; *Scown v. Czarnecki*, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276. *Contra*, *Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines*, 138 Iowa, 730; 117 N. W. 309; *Allison v. Blake*, 57 N. J. L. 6, 29 Atl. 417. *Cf. State v. Halliday*, 61 Ohio St. 171, 55 N. E. 175. However, the court expressly disclaims resting its decision on that ground. The decision must then rest on the ground that the constitutional provision is not intended as an exhaustive statement of who may vote, though this does not clearly appear. If that doctrine is sound, it is not perceived what limit there would be upon the legislature enacting state-wide woman's suffrage. Both authority and sound reason would seem opposed to such a construction of the constitution. *McCafferty v. Guyer*, 59 Pa. 109. See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 7 ed., 902. It is generally held that the legislature may confer upon women the right to vote for members of a school board. *State v. Board of Election*, 9 Ohio C. C. 134, affirmed by a divided court, in 54 Ohio St. 631, 47 N. E. 1114; *Belles v. Burr*, 76 Mich. 1; *Wheeler v. Brady*, 15 Kan. 26. But this is because of the extensive powers given to the legislature in school matters, and goes no further. See *State v. Board of Elections, supra*, 138; *State v. Adams*, 58 Ohio St. 612, 616, 51 N. E. 135, 136. *Cf. Coffin v. Election Commissioners*, 97 Mich. 188, 56 N. W. 567. One more possible basis upon which the decision might rest is, that in so far as they conflict, the Home Rule amendment repeals the original provision of the constitution. It is improbable that this was the intent of the people in adopting the amendment. In 1912, the people of Ohio rejected state-wide woman's suffrage by a vote of 336,000 to 249,000. It was again defeated in 1914 by a majority of 189,000. In 1917, a law giving the franchise to women in presidential elections was submitted to a referendum and defeated. Further, if this is a sound construction of the amendment, a city might extend the suffrage to lunatics, criminals, and minors, and conversely it might confine it to women. If the word "male" were stricken from the constitution, a city might still restrict the suffrage in municipal elections to men. Such a result can hardly have been contemplated. The decision is difficult to support either on principle or authority.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW — FINALITY OF ORDER OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. — The Public Service Commission of New York, after a hearing at which testimony was introduced and the case was argued, ordered a gas company to provide gas service to an outlying district. The lower